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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the two conflict,1 8 and in the absence of such a conflict the rights
of the parties should be governed by the contract. Therefore,
as to a particular tract, if the user of the servitude is accom-
plished according to the intentions of the parties, the interrup-
tion of prescription should not be limited by a unit. In the in-
stant case the user was found to be consistent with the inten-
tions even though no drilling occurred on the tract. There was
an actual drainage of minerals from the extremities of the tract;
therefore, the production was as effective as any which the
servitude owner could have accomplished even had he been
allowed to drill to the unitized zone. In this sense the user was
in keeping with the contemplation of the parties and the servi-
tude was properly maintained to all depths by drainage from the
single horizon. The mention that the parties could have con-
tractually limited the servitude is noteworthy. The implication
is that if the contract had limited the servitude horizontally, the
effect of the unitization would have been so restricted.
John B. Hussey, Jr.
SUSPENSION OF LAWS BY CONCURRENT RESOLUTION OF THE
LEGISLATURE
In each of the last two sessions of the Louisiana Legislature
concurrent resolutions have been passed which purport to sus-
pend the operation or enforcement of regularly enacted statutes.1
This procedure presents two problems: first, the legal effective-
ness of a concurrent resolution to suspend a statute; and, sec-
ond, the desirability of allowing this practice, if legal, to con-
tinue.
The only case in which a Louisiana court has ruled on the
effectiveness of a concurrent resolution to suspend the operation
of a law is State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean.2 In 1934 the Leg-
islature had placed an occupational tax of five cents per barrel
on petroleum refiners, s but before the first payment of the tax
18. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Production Co., 221
La. 608, 60 So.2d 9 (1952).
1. La. H. Con. Res. 4, 5, 6 (E.S. 1955), all relative to the suspension of LA.
R.S. 32:341 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 501, p. 922. La. H. Con. Res.
4 (E.S. 1955), also relative to the partial suspension of LA. R.S. 48:345 (1950),
as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 501, p. 922. La. H. Con. Res. 43, 19th Reg. Sess.
(1956), suspending LA. R.S. 32:281(D), 32:282 (1950).
2. 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (1935).
3. La. Acts 1934 (3 E.S.), No. 15, p. 304.
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was due, a special session of the Legislature passed a House
Concurrent Resolution which purported to authorize the Gov-
ernor to suspend that part of the tax in excess of one cent per
barrel.4 The day following the adoption of this resolution the
Governor issued a proclamation suspending the tax for a period
of eight months.5 Later in the same session the Legislature again
authorized the Governor to suspend the tax, but this authoriza-
tion was in the form of a regularly enacted law.6 In sustaining
the suspension of the tax the Supreme Court quoted Article XIX,
Section 5, of the Constitution, which provides: "No power of
suspending laws of this State shall be exercised unless by the
Legislature, or by its authority." The court reasoned that as
the Legislature of a state, unlike Congress, may do anything
which the Constitution does not prohibit and since the Constitu-
tion provides no regulations concerning the method by which laws
are to be suspended, the suspension in the case at bar under
the authority of a concurrent resolution was valid.6 The court
also noted that on two recent occasions the Attorney General,
the plaintiff in the case, had ruled that suspensions of taxes by
concurrent resolutions were valid.9 In adopting the judgment
of the lower court the Supreme Court specifically declared both
the concurrent resolution and the act confirming it "to be valid
and constitutional.' 0 Some support for the Groslean case may
be found in the similar interpretations given the words "the
Legislature" when used elsewhere in the Constitution. In the
cases of Lewis v. State" and Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v.
State, 2 both decided after the Grosfean case, the Supreme Court
held that the action by "the Legislature" required by Article
III, Section 35,1S did not need to be approved by the Governor,
and could in fact be validly exercised by resolution. 4 Likewise,
4. La. H. Con. Res. 1 (1 E.S. 1935).
5. State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 303, 161 So. 871, 872 (1935).
6. La. Acts 1935, (1 E.S. 1935), p. 450.
7. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 5.
8. State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 316-17, 161 So. 871, 877
(1935).
9. Id. at 316, 161 So. at 876-77; La. Op. Atty. Gen. 1932-34, p. 956; La. Op.
Atty. Gen. 1934-36, p. 1332.
10. State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 317-18, 161 So. 871, 877
(1935).
11. 207 La. 194, 20 So.2d 917 (1945).
12. 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331 (1947), 9 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 289 (1949).
13. "Whenever the Legislature shall authorize suit to be filed against the
state . "
14. The holding of the Lewis and Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. cases was fol-
lowed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Preuett v. State, 62 So.2d 686
(La. App. 1953).
19571
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
in State ex rel. Morris v. Mason15 the court held that since the
Constitution requires only action by "the Legislature" in pro-
posing constitutional amendments,6 a gubernatorial veto of a
proposed amendment is ineffective. In view of the holding of the
Grosjean case and the similar position taken in the Lewis, Jef-
ferson Lake Sulphur Co., and Mason cases, the writer sub-
mits that the Supreme Court would probably uphold the power
of the Legislature to suspend laws by concurrent resolution if
the question were again presented for decision.
There are, however, cogent reasons militating in favor of a
reappraisal of Louisiana's position in allowing the suspension
of laws by concurrent resolution of the Legislature. First, it
appears from reading Section 5 of Article XIX 17 that the sec-
tion was included in the Constitution in order to preclude anyone
other than the Legislature from suspending laws and not with
any intention of granting the Legislature the power to suspend
them without complying with the constitutional legislative pro-
cedure. This is borne out by the placement of the section in the
article 'containing general provisions and not in the article de-
fining the powers of the Legislature. This placement has con-
tinued from the state's first constitution in 1812 through seven
constitutions until the present time.18 In this connection it is
interesting to note that while twenty other states have similar
constitutional provisions,19 no cases have been found in which it
was even suggested to any but a Louisiana court that these pro-
visions granted the Legislature the power to suspend laws by
mere resolution. Second, the indefinite suspension of a law by
concurrent resolution amounts to an effective repeal of that law
but without the safeguards written into the normal legislative
process by the Constitution. In order to pass an ordinary re-
pealing act the Legislature must follow the procedure set out
in the Constitution, which provides such safeguards against
15. 43 La. Ann. 589, 9 So. 776 (1891).
16. "Propositions for amending the Constitution may be made by the Legis-
lature at any session .... " LA. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
17. "No power of suspending laws of this State shall be exercised unless by
the Legislature, or by its authority." LA. CONST. art. XIX. § 5.
18. LA. CONST. art. 168 (1913) ; LA. CONST. art. 168 (1898) ; LA. CONST. art.
157 (1879) ; LA. CONST. art. 104 (1864) ; LA. CONST. art. 102 (1852) ; LA. CONST.
art. 106 (1845) ; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (1812).
19. These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi (by implication), New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas (by implication), Vermont, and Virginia. See also 2 LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE, PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR T11E STATE OF LOUISIANA 181 (1954).
[Vol. XVII
NOTES
hasty and ill-considered legislation as the requirements that the
Journals show the concurrence of a majority of each House in
the bill as finally adopted, 20 that every act be read on three dif-
ferent days in each House, 21 and that every act be reported by
a committee of each House and the legislative bureau.22 How-
ever, since the rules of each House govern the procedure to be
used in passing concurrent resolutions, and these rules may be
suspended at any time, existing laws may be effectively repealed
within a twenty-four hour period by suspension under a con-
current resolution, thus circumventing the protective devices
provided by the Constitution. This power to avoid the constitu-
tional delays involved in passing ordinary legislation is par-
ticularly dangerous when the result is the effective repeal of
existing laws. This is because it offers the great possibility
of final action without giving notice or an opportunity to be
heard to those outside the Legislature, who are often the ones
most vitally affected. There is no real justification for this pro-
cedure because in emergency situations it is possible to enact
suspending or repealing legislation within the brief period of
three or four days under the usual legislative process.23 Third,
the law should be easily ascertainable, but since concurrent reso-
lutions are not printed as statutes and those prior to 1954 are
not included in the commercial services, 24 the only way to deter-
mine whether a statute passed prior to 1954 has been suspended
is to search the legislative Journals, which are not available to
most lawyers and are not indexed.
The writer submits that the practice of allowing the Legis-
lature to suspend laws by concurrent resolution is extremely
unwise and serves no useful or practical purpose. The present
undesirable situation should be remedied by amending Section 5
of Article XIX. Perhaps the following language would be ap-
propriate: "No power of suspending laws of this State shall be
20. LA. CONST. art. III, f§ 24, 25.
21. Id. § 24.
22. Id. §§ 24, 31. For a more complete discussion of the constitutional pro-
visions dealing with the legislative process, see Note, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
236 (1956).
23. This may be accomplished by simultaneous introduction of identical bills
in each house.
24. Starting in the 1957 pocket parts to the Louisiana Statutes Annotated, the
West Publishing Company is including a reproduction of the full text of concur-
rent resolutions which suspend any part of the Revised Statutes or the Civil Code
in the supplemental annotation to the section or article which is suspended.
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exercised unless by an Act of the Legislature or by the authority
of such Act in the particular cases expressly provided by it."
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr.
TAXATION - MISTAKE OF FACT AS A BASIS
FOR REFUNDS OF LOUISIANA TAXES
In most states a person may obtain a refund of a tax paid
under compulsion,1 but he may not recover a tax which is "volun-
tarily" paid,2 as that term is understood in the contemplation
of law. A payment made through mistake or ignorance of law
is considered as "voluntary" and no refund is permitted.3 When
payment is made under a mistake of fact, however, the payment
is said not to be "voluntary" and recovery is allowed unless the
mistake is predicated on the taxpayer's own neglect.4 Although
this appears to be a rather artifical division of non-compulsory
payments into those which are "voluntary" and those which are
not, it accomplishes a just result in allowing recovery of taxes
erroneously paid under a mistake of fact.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provides that the Leg-
islature shall make available "a complete and adequate remedy
for the prompt recovery by every taxpayer of any illegal tax
paid by him." 5 Acting under this provision, the Legislature
passed an act in 1940 which authorized the refund of taxes
erroneously paid under either mistake of fact or mistake of law.6
This broad authorization was contained in Section 17 of that
act. Sections 15 and 16 dealt with the procedures for making
claims for refunds and for processing those claims. In 1942,
the act was amended so as to incorporate into Sections 15 and
16 all provisions pertaining to refunds and to utilize Section
1. 3 COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION 2550, § 1276 (4th ed. 1924). See also
cases collected in 64 A.L.R. 10, 13 (1924).
2. 3 CooLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION 2561, § 1282 (4th ed. 1924). See also
cases collected in 64 A.L.R. 10, 14 (1924).
3. 3 COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION 2579, § 1294 (4th ed. 1924). See also
cases collected in 64 A.L.R. 10, 33 (1924).
4. 3 COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION 2582, § 1295 (4th ed. 1924). See also
cases collected in 64 A.L.R. 10, 35 (1924).
5. LA. CONST. art. X, § 18: "The Legislature shall provide against the issuance
of process to restrain the collection of any tax and for a complete and adequate
remedy for the prompt recovery by every taxpayer of any illegal tax paid by
him."
6. La. Acts 1940, No. 265, § 17, now LA. R.S. 47:1625 (1950).
[Vol. XVII
